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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
         Francia Tabares was one of the defendants charged in a 
three-count Superseding Indictment on August 23, 1994, for their 
participation in a drug distribution ring.  Tabares was charged 
in Count One with conspiracy to distribute and possession with 
intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1) and  846, and in Count Two 
with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to 
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.  841(a)(1) and  
846.  She was not named in Count Three, which charged a 
conspiracy to import cocaine. 
         Tabares pleaded guilty to Count One of the Superseding 
Indictment on March 28, 1995, and thereafter the court dismissed 
Count Two on motion of the government.  In the plea agreement, 
the government and Tabares stipulated that if Tabares continued 
to recognize and affirmatively accept personal responsibility for 
her criminal conduct, she would be entitled to a two-point 
reduction in the overall offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G.  
3E1.1(a); that pursuant to  3E1.1(b)(1), she would be entitled 
to an additional decrease of one level for timely notifying the 
authorities of her intention to enter a plea of guilty; and that 
"the applicable guideline range for [her was] 50 to 150 kilograms 
of cocaine," resulting in an offense level of 36, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G.  2D1.1(c)(5).  PSR  44.    
         The Probation Office used  2D1.1(c)(2) of the 
Sentencing Guidelines to calculate Tabares' base offense level at 
36, from which she received a three-level downward adjustment for 
acceptance of responsibility.  This yielded a total offense level 
of 33.  Her criminal history category was I; thus, Tabares' 
guideline range was 135 to 168 months' imprisonment.  U.S.S.G. 
Ch. 5, Pt. A.  The district court imposed a sentence of 168 
months' imprisonment, to be followed by a term of 5 years of 
supervised release. 
                               II. 
         At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated:  
              Ms. Tabares, I've reviewed your record, 
         and, frankly, it is not a record that one 
         would say confers good standing on someone 
         before this Court. 
 
              You know, for someone who allegedly is 
         remorseful and respects the law, you said 
         that the last time.  You had an opportunity 
         once before: You were convicted of a drug 
         offense, you were sentenced to prison.  You 
         had an opportunity to learn what it means to 
         be restricted of your freedom and to be away 
         from your children, your family. 
 
              And you didn't learn from that 
         experience. 
 
              And in reading the presentence report, 
         it indicates that you were less than candid 
         with the Probation Officer who prepared the 
         report. Some places, you indicated you had a 
         lapse of memory, but the overall view that a 
         reader comes away with is that you're less 
         than a candid individual. 
 
              And there is really not much mercy that 
         this Court feels in your situation. 
 
 
Supp. App. at 13 (emphasis added).  The court also spoke about 
the harm wreaked on purchasers of drugs by such criminal 
activity.   
         The court explained its decision to impose the maximum 
sentence as follows:  
              I imposed a sentence on the higher end 
         of the guideline because you are not a first 
         offender before this Court, and because of 
         your prior drug offense, and because of your 
         lack of candor with the Probation Department. 
 
              I do not think that you are remorseful.  
         And this is not the sentence that calls for 
         the imposition of mercy. 
 
 
Supp. App. at 15.   
         Neither Tabares' counsel nor the prosecutor corrected 
the court's statement that Tabares had previously been convicted 
and served time behind bars.  Apparently, this first came to 
light in this case in the supplemental brief filed by counsel for 
Tabares in this court when he sought leave to withdraw the brief 
he had filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967).  At that time, defense counsel called to our attention 
the significant fact that Tabares had two prior arrests, but no 
prior convictions.  The government does not disagree with these 
facts.  Thus, we must decide what action is appropriate under 
these circumstances. 
         Tabares requests this court to remand for resentencing 
on the ground that the district court's statement demonstrates 
that the court sentenced Tabares in reliance on false or 
unreliable information, in violation of her due process rights.  
The government responds that although the district court's 
statement at sentencing regarding a prior conviction was 
technically incorrect, Tabares was not prejudiced by the error 
and therefore we should not remand for resentencing.  Because 
Tabares did not raise this issue in the district court, we review 
the district court's sentence for plain error.  See United States 
v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993). 
         To meet the plain error standard, Tabares must 
demonstrate an "error" that is not only "plain" but also 
"affect[s] substantial rights."  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  An 
error will usually be considered to have affected substantial 
rights when it is prejudicial and affected the outcome of the 
district court proceedings.  United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 
893, 897 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1716 (1995).  The Supreme Court has instructed 
that "Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited 
error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals."  
Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.  In Turcks, we said we would exercise our 
discretion "where the defendant is actually innocent, or where, 
regardless of the defendant's innocence or guilt, the error 
'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings.'"  Turcks, 41 F.3d at 897 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). 
         In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948), the 
Supreme Court stated that sentencing a defendant on the basis of 
assumptions concerning his criminal record which are materially 
untrue, "whether caused by carelessness or design, is 
inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction 
cannot stand."  In other cases, the courts have remanded for 
resentencing when the district court relied upon erroneous or 
unreliable facts or inferences at sentencing.  See United States 
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49 (1972) (remand for resentencing 
because sentencing court had relied on two convictions later 
found unconstitutional as a result of defendant's lack of 
representation); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d 
Cir. 1982) ("[A]s a matter of due process, factual matters may be 
considered as a basis for sentence only if they have some minimal 
indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation."); see also Moore 
v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[A] 
defendant should not be sentenced on the basis of information 
about him that is materially incorrect. . . .").  
         Tabares contends that her sentence violated due process 
because the district court relied upon the erroneous assumption 
that she had been convicted of a drug crime, whereas the record 
shows only that she has been arrested twice before but shows no 
prior convictions.  Thus, she argues that she is entitled to 
resentencing.  The government does not allege that it would 
suffer any prejudice should this case be remanded for 
resentencing.  Instead it argues that the district court 
expressed "more than sufficient reasons" to impose the sentence  
it did, apart from its misstatement.  Brief of Appellee at 26.  
It notes that the written judgment entered by the district court 
sets forth the following reasons:  "Prior drug arrests - not 
first offender, lack of candor with the probation office; not 
remorseful."  App. at 38.   
         Although Tabares argues she should be viewed as "a 
first offender," the presentence report, which Tabares did not 
challenge, referred to two prior arrests for drug offenses.  The 
report refers to but gives little detail about an arrest in 
California in 1986 on a charge of Transport/Sale of Narcotics.  
It states that Tabares' husband was convicted and imprisoned for 
his involvement but that disposition as to her was unknown.  The 
report also records a second arrest in 1991 in Arizona on similar 
grounds when she was charged in a two-count indictment relating 
to narcotics.  The Arizona charge was brought after she was found 
driving a truck that carried almost 20 kilograms of cocaine.  
After Tabares was released on bond, she fled to avoid 
prosecution.  PSR  71.  At the time she pled guilty in this 
case, she was still a fugitive from Arizona authorities.  PSR  
71.   
         Although the government expresses confidence that the 
district court, looking at Tabares' prior record including her 
flight from Arizona and her lack of remorse, would 
"unquestionably . . . reimpose precisely the same sentence," we 
do not have any basis to cut short the defendant's right to be 
sentenced on the basis of accurate facts, particularly because 
the district court stressed that Tabares had failed to learn from 
her prior time served.  See Supp. App. at 13.  As the Supreme 
Court stated: 
              We are not at liberty to assume that items given 
              such emphasis by the sentencing court, did not 
              influence the sentence which the prisoner is now 
              serving.   
 
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 740-41. 
         We need not decide today whether every situation in 
which a district court relied on a mistaken belief about a prior 
conviction would require resentencing.  We merely hold that under 
the circumstances presented here, Tabares is entitled to be 
resentenced based on accurate information as to her prior record. 
         In remanding for resentencing, we believe it is 
important to note that the district court did not get the help 
from counsel to which it was entitled.  Defense counsel has 
conceded that he failed to pick up the misstatement as to 
Tabares' prior conviction.  The Assistant United States Attorney 
explained at oral argument before us that fourteen defendants 
were being sentenced within three days, which may explain the 
scenario under which these events occurred.  We note, however, 
that the government counsel, as well as defense counsel, has a 
responsibility to assure that the district court is relying on 
accurate facts.  See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935).   
         In any event, we are satisfied that a remand is not 
only in the interest of justice for Tabares but helps to promote 
the public's confidence in the judicial system's willingness to 
do justice.  Of course, we do not make any observations or 
suggestions about the resentencing itself, leaving that to the 
district court. 
                               III. 
         For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence 
of the district court and remand for resentencing.  
 
